In addition to e-learning content, the e-learning branch of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) offers software solutions and consulting services for e-learning content development and learning management systems. The teams that develop the e-learning content are diverse and distributed, and include people from different cultures, located in different countries, with skills from different disciplines, and different experiences with technology. Equally important to our work is the knowledge that the learners to whom the content is delivered are also diverse and distributed. We have encountered diverging perceptions of the notion of “good” e-learning content. This concerns technical and didactical aspects as well as the content itself. In this presentation we shall describe how we define quality under these circumstances and how we can assure it.
The paper aims to present an e-Learning project concerning "The edition of medieval sources in the World Wide Web" which was part of the more general project "Humanities on the World Wide Web" at the Faculty for Philosophy and History of Hamburg University (2003-2005). This project started from two observations: – Today a lot of (medieval and other) sources are made accessible in the World Wide Web, partly in the original, partly in (mostly older) translations. But there is little dis-cussion on standards, and though these sources are frequently used, the problems involved are only rarely discussed in university teaching. Especially, there is no rela-tionship between e-Learning and the use and presentation of sources. – Sources are fundamental for any kind of research in the historical sciences, and for the earlier periods, Ancient, Medieval or Early Modern History, intensive training is necessary to work with them. Therefore, at all history departments the so-called auxil-iary sciences and other aspects of methodology are taught to beginners and to ad-vanced students, each on different levels. Nevertheless, up to now there have been only few efforts to develop something like a curriculum on auxiliary sciences and methodology based on e-Learning courses and/or blended learning. In consequence, the project had the following objectives: – to discuss basic problems of the presentation of sources in the WWW; – to introduce students into the critical use and also into the edition of sources; – to develop materials for e-Learning courses on auxiliary sciences and methodology; – to test the possibilities of e-Learning for the basic training in the historical sciences. Now, after two years, the project has reached the end of its planned duration. These are the results: – A group of students was formed which worked together for two years, e.g. in two seminars and in additional meetings. They evaluated existing presentations of sources in the WWW, helped in developing a basic structure for the discussion and presentation of sources and prepared themselves several sources for editions in the WWW. Some will even use these sources for the final paper during their examina-tions. – Based on the observations and the needs of the students, an e-Learning course on auxiliary sciences and the critical discussion of sources was developed. It offers a very general introduction, but can also be used as reference work and includes some self-tests. Therefore, it can be used with or without an accompanying seminar. – The teaching units on auxiliary sciences and methodology were successfully tested in seminars for beginners and also for advanced students. – Based on the evaluation of the presentations of medieval sources in the WWW, the concept of collections of sources based in Hamburg was changed to that of a port of-fering several approaches to the materials. The main aim is to develop an “informa-tional system” with clear structures open to any interested user. This concept is still under discussion. Of course, the results of the project are only the beginning. In this field, much more work is necessary.
E-learning is an educational technique that combines old and modern teaching methodologies and techniques. In fact, e-learning covers previous educational techniques, including computer-assisted and web-based education. E-learning could be defined as the use of digital techniques that are part of computer software, communication networks and databases for the purpose of carrying out teaching and learning activities. The disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities are characterized by a set of common paradigmatic and scientific features. The various branches of these two fields vary in terms of their nature, the research tools they use and their way of thinking. As a result, the techniques used in teaching and learning in these disciplines vary too. Perhaps the most outstanding feature that broadly characterizes these fields is the importance they attach to the human, social and intellectual aspect, which entails a great measure of communication, discussion and debate as well as exchanging experience and contacts with a large number of experts. Contemporary civilizational challenges facing the Arab and Muslim nations make it imperative to boost the skills of research, critical contemplation and thinking among students of these disciplines. This paper introduces a number of learning opportunities available within the field of e-learning in a way that would enhance the teaching and learning enterprises in social sciences and humanities. This paper also sheds light on the theoretical components and practical requirements necessary for building an efficient and enjoyable teaching-learning environment capable of bringing together direct human contact and purposeful social interaction while strengthening the element of infinite flexibility that drives and characterizes e-learning.
Many universities and colleges are adopting alternative education methods to complement traditional classroom-based learning. Methods applying an e-learning approach are being developed and applied in higher education and they are transforming the nature of higher education. The ultimate goal is to find the optimum balance between traditional learning and e-learning, which we term integrated learning. But finding this balance is challenging, especially in the social sciences and humanities. The search for this balance is further complicated by ever more complex curricula, resources and institutional requirements. Looking towards the future, expert systems will be required to support students and administrators alike in finding this balance by helping to define optimum integrated learning scenarios at various levels, including down to the individual course level. This paper presents current, ongoing work on an integrated learning model that could in the future be deployed in higher education institutions to support the effective and efficient definition of integrated learning.
Even with Saddam Hussein’s regime removed, the Gulf states will likely continue to ally and cooperate with the United States in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The Gulf states fear potential Iranian aggression or intimidation, they view the outcome of the ongoing violence and power struggles in Iraq as uncertain, and the Gulf governments – particularly Saudi Arabia -- have faced a threat from heightened activity by Al Qaeda or pro Al Qaeda activists in the Gulf states themselves. However, it is also reasonable to expect that, with the conventional military threat from Iraq now removed and the U.S. military presence in Iraq relatively unpopular in the Arab world, some of the Gulf states might move closer to a broad Arab consensus on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and will likely press the Bush Administration to elevate resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute on the Administration’s agenda.
In the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003, when it became clear that the major public justification for the war, Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, had no basis in fact, the Bush Administration quickly emphasized a new public justification for the war. Post-Saddam Iraq would become a democratic beacon in the Middle East, leading to more open politics throughout the region. It is very tempting to assume that this change of message is simply public relations, an insincere effort to sell a policy to both American public opinion and to the world. Undoubtedly, at least in the public presentation element, there is some truth to this assumption. However, it would be a mistake to see the American “democratization” initiative in the Middle East as merely a cover for other, more traditional great power motivations
1. What are the intentions of the Bush Administration for the new term? Will there be a concerted reconstruction effort or implementation of an exit strategy? 2. What are the possible outcomes in Iraq in terms of governance? 3. To what degree is the US still in control of events inside Iraq or have events preceded to such a degree that the US is mainly a reactive participant? 4. What are the dangers of a failed US policy in Iraq for the GCC states? 5. What can the GCC states do to mitigate the negative consequences from the Iraq crisis? What are some of alternatives available to the GCC countries to assist in influencing the future direction of the Iraq state?
As the organizers of this conference have indicated in their description about this session, the most important issue Iran poses for the Gulf and the central issue in U.S.-Iran relations is Iran’s nuclear program. So that will be the main focus of my remarks today.
To discuss any post-war economic scenario and address the Middle East and European issues, the United States has to be the starting point. The US is in recovery mode after a number of years of economic slowdown. There are specific reasons for such development now, the most important being presidential elections in November 2004. As part of the US monetary policy, the Federal Reserve is pursuing a low interest rate policy that injects liquidity into the market and stimulates consumerism. The fiscal policy is also stimulative -- the US, which had a two percent government balance surplus under Bill Clinton, moved to have a five percent GDP deficit in a few years. There is a massive tax reduction that allows the private taxpayer to have more disposable income. The US also supports its recovery via a weak dollar. The aim is to keep the exchange rates artificially low. The foreign exchange dealers in the world know that the Americans are interested in a weak dollar, pre-empt future action and depress the value of the dollar. The monetary policy will change next summer with interest rates increasing. The fiscal policy will change after the new president is in office, with interest rates rising in order to attract foreign capital and finance the current account deficit, which holds the risk of a very weak US-dollar. In addition, the US has to increase taxes.
No doubt, the Third Gulf War, which led to the removal of Saddam Hussein and to the US-UK occupation of Iraq, constitutes a watershed event, not just for the history of modern Iraq, but also for the history for the whole Gulf region. The war carries a slew of implications, both current and potential, for the GCC States, which have to bear part of the brunt of the deteriorating conditions in Iraq. This is due mainly to the GCC States’ geographical proximity to Iraq as well as their prominent standing on the world oil stage. It would, certainly, not be far-fetched to say that the future security and stability of the GCC States in particular, and the wider Gulf region in general, rest in great measure on the course developments in Iraq would take in the future. In view of the fact that the war in Iraq is not yet completely over, particularly since conditions across the towns and villages in the country are getting more complicated by the day, the GCC States need to dwell seriously on the dilemmas arising out of the current situation in Iraq. The GCC States, indeed, need to formulate a sustainable vision for the future in a bid to articulate appropriate policies capable of managing the myriad developments unfolding in post-Saddam Iraq. It needs to be stressed that the deepening insecurity in Iraq, compounded by worsening political and socio-economic conditions, are bound to confront the Gulf region one way or another with multiple challenges.
If the US invaded Iraq to extend their influence over the Gulf, the ground realities indicate that their intention is far from becoming absolutely real, said veteran German journalist-author Prof. Dr. Peter Scholl-Latour. Speaking at a lecture on “New balance of power in the Middle East” organized by the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center and German Business Council late on Saturday, Scholl-Latour outlined his thoughts keeping in view the developments in Iraq and Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
With nearly 10 Central and Eastern European Countries expected to join the European Union this year, the concept of European unity has reached a level that raises the question of the finality of the integration and identity. Against the background of the expected expansion of the union, notably Cyprus, and the possibility of Turkish accession, the paper discusses the political and economic ramifications of EU's relations with its new neighbors, particularly the GCC States, in the long and short run. Internally, the European Union faces continuous pressure to reach a common ground on political and security issues, as well as a uniform legal structure. Toward this end, a genuine leadership structure could enhance continuity, visibility and coherence in European politics. The success of the European Union project does not only depend on the internal organization after the enlargement, but to a large extend on its ability to improve cooperation with foreign countries in different areas. And, whether the larger Europe of 450 million inhabitants can make use of its potential will also depend on whether the Europeans succeed in creating their own thinking culture on international dimensions and in implementing them through effective security, foreign and defence policies. The GCC States are of enormous strategic importance for the EU because they posses about 46% of the world's proven oil reserves and are the main exporters of energy to the world. Furthermore, the GCC and the EU have a common interest in peace and stability in the region, especially with regard to the future of Iraq .
Differences in approach on Gulf issues are becoming a major point of contention between the United States and the countries of the European Union. These differences reflect the larger processes of change in the North Atlantic alliance since the end of the Cold War. The EU is emerging as an increasingly unified economic bloc that acts as a unitary player in the world economy. It is becoming a major competitor of the United States on trade and investment issues with the Gulf states. On security issues, the EU has not achieved that same level of internal coherence. The United States enjoyed the support of a number of important EU governments in the recent war against Iraq, even as France and Germany took very public positions against Washington. Washington will continue to pursue bilateral security relations with European states on Gulf issues, in part to prevent the emergence of a unified European competitor on strategic Gulf issues. On the economic front, the EU is emerging as a major commercial competitor of the US in the Gulf region. Washington and Brussels have had very different views on how to deal with Iran for well over a decade. EU companies have already established advantages over American companies in Iran. In the new Iraq, it remains to be seen how
It is hard to over-estimate what is at stake in Iraq today. Initially its occupation and transformation were to have been the defining moment of George W. Bush’s presidency. However, the manner in which the rest of the world were told about this neo-conservative project (more than the nature of the project itself) alienated many in the international community. Both governments and societies in Russia, France, Germany and much of Europe beyond greeted the invasion of Iraq with suspicion if not outright hostility. Whatever the motivations behind regime change and European reactions to it, today it is startlingly clear that the removal of Saddam Hussain has proved to be the beginning not the culmination of a long and very uncertain process of occupation and state building. A combination of ideological vigour, insufficient planning and misperception about Iraqi state and society has meant that the aftermath of war has proved much more troublesome than regime change itself. US troops face an insurgency that during November spread in geographic reach and levels of violence and destruction. Given the diplomatic rancour and political hostility that greeted the invasion across Europe, a certain amount of Schardenfreude about what is happening in Iraq today was to be expected. However, it has to be realised that the failure of American attempts to replace Saddam Hussain’s regime with a stable, liberal government would have catastrophic consequences far beyond the region and the United States. A violently unstable Iraq, bridging the mashreq and the Gulf would undermine the already fragile domestic and the regional stability of the surrounding states and the wider region beyond. Iraq would act as a magnet, drawing in radical Islamists from across the Muslim world, eager to fight US troops where they are at their most vulnerable, on Middle Eastern soil. With this growing anarchy neighboring states would be sucked into the country, competing for influence, using Iraqi proxies to violently further their own regime’s interests. Broadly comparable to the Lebanese civil war, but much less containable, an ungovernable Iraq would be equally threatening to the interests of all the European powers whatever their attitudes to the war that gave rise to it. In the face of increasing violence and societal alienation the occupying authorities face a very complex set of tasks which they clearly cannot carry out without much greater international, that means European, assistance. To stand any chance of success this whole process must be quickly and effectively multi-lateralised. Since April it has become apparent that alone America does not have the expertise in state building, the numbers of troops or indeed the financial resources needed to re-build Iraq and guarantee its long-term stability. Without the active involvement of the international community the United States will not be able to extract itself from a vicious circle of increasing violence, societal alienation and rising human and financial costs. Although there is much opposition to a new multilateral occupation of Iraq in Washington there is also a great deal of hostility in key European capitals. If both sides, the administration in Washington and key European states, continue to block a truly multi-lateral approach to Iraq then the country will slide into further chaos and violence. That outcome, at this stage the most likely, will harm the interests of all the great powers not simply the re-election prospects of George Bush.
The backdrop to the tangled relations between the European Economic Community/European Union and the countries of the Mediterranean littoral and the Gulf Co-operation Council is a chain of unsuccessful and successive initiatives on the part of the Europeans in respect of the Arab world. The entire process, now spanning a period of almost forty years, has been termed the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Paradoxically the initial stimulus for the Euro-Arab Dialogue was the Arab-Israeli War (6-24 October) of 1973 and the concerted, coordinated action against the West that followed. The Arab countries first began to use oil as a weapon in the Middle East struggle. For six months between October 1973 and March 1974, the Arab oil producing countries maintained an embargo on oil exports to countries in the West that showed a pro-Israeli stance. This action exposed a fundamental European economic vulnerability and at the same time forced the Europeans to re-examine their uncritical support for Israel in general and its expansionist policies in particular. Subsequently it also exerted considerable pressure on the countries of Western Europe not only to revise their policies vis-à-vis Israel but equally importantly, to have their views and opinions (thus far largely ignored by the Europeans), taken seriously into account.
In the light of the United States monopolizing influence on the region and the strain it has come to bear on the societies, the ineffectiveness of the Gulf Cooperation Council- European Union (GCC-EU) relationship is very evident. It has neither progressed far enough for both parties to realize the full potential of inter-regional cooperation nor served the strategic rationale for a mutually beneficial cooperation. It certainly does not reflect the historical, geopolitical and strategic considerations, and the strong interdependence of the two regions and their links. As a result, there appears to be discontent, disillusionment and a negotiation fatigue among the signatories of the 1988 GCC-EU cooperation agreement. At the same time, the GCC-EU relations are multi-faceted in character and multi-dimensional in scope, a fact which not only reflects the depth of the common interests underpinning the ties, but also calls for a serious and sustainable upgrading of the same. The need to ensure and maintain international security and stability in the world demands that both move toward reducing the existing chasm.
The aim of the paper is to explore ways and means of reinforcing the EU-GCC relationship. It proposes a future strategy for the EU–GCC relations, which go beyond the existing stalled model of cooperation. The point of departure is that the Cooperation Agreement of the 1980s, which currently stands as the base for the EU-GCC interregional relations is neither an adequate nor an appropriate framework for this relationship. In order to realize the potential of their cooperation, the two parties need to revamp their relationship on the basis of a new partnership. This should reflect not only historical, geo-political and strategic considerations, as well as the interdependencies and the existing crucial links between the two regions but also the new emerging realities post Sept 11, the fight against terrorism, the post-Saddam Iraq and the US policy for the region. It should also address the deep dissatisfaction from both sides of the utility of on-going dialogue and goes a long way to meet their hopes and aspirations for a relationship that accord each party its due weight and importance. The new EU-GCC partnership should be based on several pillars and programs; (1) political and strategic dialogue which includes regional peace and security, developing shared political common ground, cooperation against terrorism, reform, human rights, good governance and democracy; (2) an economic partnership with a free trade zone, further enhancing the prospects for joint ventures, technological and industrial cooperation and investments; (3) a high-level energy dialogue and environmental cooperation; (4) Social and human cooperation including education, development of human resources, promotion of understanding between the different cultures and an exchange at the level of civil society. To avoid some of the pitfalls of the past dialogue, the two parties should not simply rush to make vacuous declarations about their motives and intentions but to put real efforts and commitments into implementing and successfully carrying out these programs. Clear achievable objectives and measurable targets should be established with reasonable time frame for implementation. The two parties should agree joint budgets for their programs, find ways of financing them and ensure that they are adequately and appropriately funded. The new partnership should also involve public participation from both sides to provide it with the necessary momentum and grant it popular support.
The paper tackles a number of important questions regarding the past and present of relations of members of the European Union (EU) regarding the U.S.-led war that toppled the regime of Saddam Hussain and the unfolding transition and reconstruction process in Iraq. This paper aims at providing some background on the role of the European Union and its member countries in this process and offers some recommendations for future EU engagement. The Iraq issue has been for a long time excluded from the operations of EU’s foreign policy approach and the community as such had never any contractual relations with Iraq. The topic was not among the community’s traditional areas of foreign policy, for it was regarded as being too divisive for a common position, and, in addition, being reserved for Britain’s and France’s privileged status as permanent members of the UN Security Council. The paper examines different European roles towards Iraq in pre and after war. When US pressure mounted to solve the Iraq problem by regime change, the tensions in the Security Council increasingly transmitted on the members of the European Union. The chances for consensus-building among the different actors were seriously damaged at an early stage when Britain and Spain fixed positions without even informing, let alone consulting their fellow partners in the EU. The paper argues that the nature of the Iraqi regime in the domestic and regional context supported the US position against the European opponents. The paper discusses the after math disagreement within the EU, which somewhat softened, but the different approaches of the British-Spanish camp on the one hand, and the Franco-German camp on the other, remained clearly discernable. The paper also touches very basic questions of the future make-up of the international system in general and the transatlantic relations in particular. This naturally involved a discussion of the nature of the transatlantic partnership and a vision of the role of the US and NATO for European and international security alike. In the same line the paper highlights the disputed points of view over reconstruction Iraq.
The paper entitled “The Role of The EU in the Arabian Gulf” sets out from the central premise that in the face of the hegemonic and unilateralist outreach of the US, both the GCC States and the EU need to think innovatively to frame a sustainable modus operandi for a strategic bilateral partnership. The existent imbalance in the mutual relations between the EU and the GCC States makes it imperative for Europe to reactivate its traditional role in the Gulf region, and not completely forfeit it to the benefit of US domination. On the Arab-Israeli front, the EU's role still has a long way to go to compete effectively with Washington. The wider Middle East region today runs a serious risk of sliding into unmanageable instability, wider violence and greater Israeli dominance. The GCC States could capitalize on their political and economic leverage to induce Europe to take up a stronger role in the power politics of the region with their combined efforts directed to precluding the implementation of any solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that might not answer the legitimate demands of the Palestinian people. As far as the issue of security is concerned, the EU could play a more active role by devising coherent and unified foreign and security policies to deal with the crises and problems that face the Gulf region. In this regard, there is an urgent need for co-operation between the GCC States and EU to conclude a long-term agreement with goals and objectives suitable to the nature and peculiarities of the two parties. Regarding Iraq, the EU needs to move from its current static position and play a clear role based on a genuine co-operative mechanism to overcome the difficulties facing the country and its people. In this regard, the EU should extend its support to Iraq’s reintegration into the international community, share its experience on how to design political institutions, foster the reconstruction of Iraqi civil society, support the reform of the educational system, and assist in reopening the Iraqi oil sector to international investment and participation in order to upgrade and expand the Iraqi oil production capacities. The EU role in the Gulf region cannot be complete without advancing the idea of forming a partnership with GCC countries. Such a step could help in bringing about political stability and economic development in the region, which is of great importance for the EU's political and economic interests. This new initiative should be based on the true spirit of partnership, avoiding the impression that it is behaving in a dominant and neo-colonial nature.
Based on the premise that “dialogue is the essence of life”, Professor Fred Halliday suggested that the future of the Arabian Gulf would depend on the way the evolving politico-socio-economic changes are managed. The long-term challenge in the region, in his opinion, is to ensure a working relationship between the Arab Gulf countries and Iran, and especially between the three big regional players – Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. The London School of Economics academic insisted that the Arabian Peninsula is a “political state”, whose unity is compelled by socio-economic factors and influenced by events around it – the history of the Gulf is greatly influenced by Nasserism and the 1958 and 1979 events in Iraq and Iran respectively. He also suggested that conflicts in the region are not based on historical struggles as much as being rooted in nationalism – the Iran-Iraq struggle was essentially a result of a clash between anti-Persian and anti-Arab sentiments. He urged caution in evaluating the role of external forces in the region – their influence should neither be overestimated nor underestimated. In defense, he cited the inability of Russia to influence Saddam Hussein’s aggressive policies and pointed to the flaw in big powers ignoring smaller states in international politics. Discussing future regional stability, he said that despite witnessing major wars in the last 25 years, no outstanding problem is without a peaceful solution. Citing the complex Indo-Pak and Chinese-Taiwanese crises, he said the Iran-Iraq differences over the Shatt-Al-Arab and the Iran-UAE differences over the Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs islands are minor irritants from the perspective of international relations and could be resolved bilaterally. Providing a prognosis of the link between domestic and foreign policies, he said that education, empowerment of women and the level of government transparency are the defining factors of domestic freedom in the region, which would only be marginally influenced by external factors. Predicting no quick-fix solution to the push for democracy in the region, he stressed that Western history showed that democracy took a long time to evolve and contended that democracy occurs only when rulers introduce reforms in response to people’s pressure for their rights and not as a result of external pressure – the history from below has been ignored in favor of history from above. He concluded by saying that the West holds considerable prejudice towards people in the Middle East, mostly due to a lack of awareness about the region and its peoples. At the same time, he pointed to the region’s stereotyped prejudice against the West, implying that “dialogue is the essence of life”
Professor Udo Steinbach delivered a lecture entitled “German Foreign Policy and the Middle East: In Quest of a Concept.” Professor Steinbach is the director of the Hamburg-based German Institute for the Middle East Studies. The history of Arab-German relations dates back to the end of the eighth century. The Emperor Charlemagne (742-814), King of the Franks and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and Caliph Harun Al- Rashid had an official contact for the first time around the year 800 A.D. Arab traders had their first business contacts with their German counterparts as early as 700 A.D. Ever since the two cultures met, they have not ceased to mutually learn from each other. The Holy Koran was translated into German in 1616 and the first Arabic grammar book was published in Germany in 1781. The economic relations between the GCC countries and Germany stand at a fairly good level. GCC exports to Germany picked up by a substantial 20 per cent from 1999 to 2002, while imports by the GCC countries of German goods and commodities rose by a hefty 65 per cent during the same period. The relations between the GCC states and Germany, however, are not exclusively limited to economic exchanges. Germany, in fact, has been consistently perceived in the Gulf in a highly positive and friendly light. In the current crisis involving the war on Iraq, Germany played a prominent role in the coalition opposing the war on Iraq. Berlin was the first to oppose any intervention in Iraq without the official approval of the UN Security Council, putting its transatlantic relations and the unity of Europe at stake. Yet, it did not give in to international pressure and remained faithful to its principles. The German stand has been highly appreciated by the majority of the Arabs.
A United States led attack on the government of Iraq in March 2003 looks almost inevitable. The only way a large-scale invasion of Iraq by US troops before March could possibly be avoided is either if a section of the Republican Guard stages a pre-emptive coup, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein dies or if the government of Iraq agrees to United Nations demands for the supervised destruction of its remaining weapons of mass destruction capability. For different reasons none of these options looks very likely. The alternative will be a short but intensive air war of up to three weeks, followed by an invasion of up to 350,000 troops from Kuwait and Turkey.
A United States led attack on the government of Iraq in March 2003 looks almost inevitable. The only way a large-scale invasion of Iraq by US troops before March could possibly be avoided is either if a section of the Republican Guard stages a pre-emptive coup, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein dies or if the government of Iraq agrees to United Nations demands for the supervised destruction of its remaining weapons of mass destruction capability. For different reasons none of these options looks very likely. The alternative will be a short but intensive air war of up to three weeks, followed by an invasion of up to 350,000 troops from Kuwait and Turkey.
