Among the many strategic and economic issues facing the Gulf in the coming years, those relating to the Indian Ocean are set to be among the most challenging. In the re-ordering of global economic and political power which is currently underway, the Indian Ocean constitutes a key arena for regional and global competition and rivalry. With the leading Asian powers playing a more proactive role in the region, sometimes with conflicting ambitions, and the United States intent on maintaining its established maritime hegemony there, the potential dangers for the Gulf states are considerable. Gulf economic interests and perhaps regime stability would be severely affected by conflict. This book contends that the Gulf states need to play an active part in the promotion of Indian Ocean stability and security, working with other Indian Ocean states to develop institutional structures and practices which encourage cooperation and provide avenues for conflict resolution. They have everything to gain from such a strategy. This volume is based on a workshop held at the Gulf Research Meeting organized by the Gulf Research Centre Cambridge in summer 2017.
The bitter confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not only stoking conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, but now threatens the stability, security and well-being of the whole Gulf region. All the major global powers have significant interests in this area, and the pursuit of these interests adds further layers of division and conflict. This book goes to the heart of this issue, examining the critical modalities whereby the “Gulf Cold War” can be brought to an end. What is needed, the contributors argue, is the creation of a security community among the states of the Gulf. The processes through which this could be achieved are carefully examined. All those interested in the future and well-being of the Gulf region should give consideration to the perspectives advanced. This volume is based on a workshop held at the Gulf Research Meeting organized by the Gulf Research Center Cambridge in summer 2016.
While the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have confronted numerous and diverse challenges with serious consequences in recent years, the year 2016 can be classified as one of the most challenging years so far. Not only were all GCC countries negatively impacted by the global oil price collapse, but serious political and security challenges and crises swept the region and its Arab geographic surroundings. Taken together, this severely restricted the GCC’s ability to deal with such challenges.
The Gulf is in the first rank of potential global flashpoints. It is the largest market for weapons imports in the world and is considered to be a vital interest of all the great powers. Ran is viewed as an expansionist threat by Arab states of the Gulf, who have built considerable militaries in a historically short timeframe. Security in the Gulf, however, is a complicated matter. The Arab states of the Gulf have pursued different defense policies, as well as different ways of building up their forces. In some instances, the establishment of a strong military is not just a way to ensure security, but also a way to build a national identity. In other cases, great powers (such as the United States) seek to promote cooperation between the Arab Gulf militaries as an interim step to promote political reform and integration.
Wars continue to ravage in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Refugees are wandering around aimlessly in the Middle East with many fleeing to Europe. Saudi Arabia and Iran are adding fuel to the flames. They are vying for supremacy while remaining highly suspicious of each other. A Conference for Security and Cooperation could help to ease existing tensions. Many years ago the CSCE was a resounding success. It could thus serve as a blueprint with the nuclear agreement with Iran as a starting point of such a venture.
This paper will chronicle ASEAN’s approach towards regional security, discuss some of the security architectures in the region, and conclude by offering a prognosis on whether ASEAN would be able to maintain its centrality and be the driving force in maintaining peace and stability in the region. It concludes by seeing what lessons can be drawn from ASEAN’s Security Cooperation.
The Arab uprisings which started in early 2011 from the Maghreb to the Mashreq have rightfully provoked an incredible burgeoning of research projects and fueled existing ones with new energy. Among the issues the so-called “Arab Spring” has put the focus on is the question of its impact on the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).Narrowing the focus to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the international research community faced two main questions. First, would the wave of Arab uprisings submerge the Kingdom or stop on its shores? Second, it appeared that Saudi Arabia had proven rather resilient to the regional disturbances, but how could one analyze its response to the ambient disorder? This paper aims at answering the latter question.
This book edited by Ranjit Gupta, Abubaker Bagader, Talmiz Ahmed and N. Janardhan explores how growing economic ties between Asian countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) could impact their future relationship. It postulates that the stage is now set for strategic partnerships and highlights how some Asian countries have been explicit about showcasing their power and influence in the Gulf region. While exploring an alternative and broad-based security architecture, it identifies the challenges that any probable Asian cooperative approach could face as the countries of the Arabian Gulf show signs of looking beyond the United States to develop their long-term strategic interests. The volume is a product of a workshop held the 2012 Gulf Research Meeting organized by the Gulf Research Center, Cambridge.
Nuclear proliferation remains one of the key issues of the contemporary global security agenda and one of the major issues of the current strategic configuration of the Middle East. In the Middle East, nuclear proliferation is an issue of concern for two reasons: firstly, because of the degree of potential crisis in a structurally unstable region; secondly, the presence of a particularly evident strategic interdependence and political competition, existing above all between those countries belonging to the geopolitical Islamic space, which raises the risk of miscalculations. Thus, the nuclear issue remains central to the strategic calculations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union (EU). This paper explores the state of relations between the GCC and the EU, the state of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and the approaches of the EU and the GCC concerning this specific topic. It also outlines some policy options and proposals on how the EU and GCC may foster a more meaningful and effective relationship concerning nuclear non-proliferation.
As part of its project "Promoting Deeper EU-GCC Relations", the GRC is releasing a Gulf Paper entitled “EU-GCC Cooperation: Securing the Transition in Yemen” written by Edward Burke, associate fellow at the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE). This paper was presented and debated last April at Qatar University, Doha as part of a conference organized by the GRC, the Institute for European Studies from Vrije Universiteit, Brussels and Qatar University on an EU-GCC dialogue on foreign policy issues. For the GCC, Yemen is an occasion to develop and prove its ability in terms of foreign politics. For the EU, it is an occasion to develop its relation with the GCC without being in the forefront of interventions in the Yemeni crisis. This paper highlights the GCC involvement in Yemen, its efforts to stabilize the country and its partnership with the EU. It discloses the author’s argument in favor of less region-to-region operations and more bilateral cooperation.
Globalization has multiplied security challenges and significantly reduced the gap between domestic and international security. Security threats that develop within a domestic context can quickly escalate to have an impact beyond borders. Besides, the line between traditional and non-traditional threats to security has become increasingly blurred. New and complex security issues including pandemics, migration, energy security, cyber warfare, and climate change present decision-makers with challenges that need quick and efficient responses. In this context, good governance becomes a key issue. The first annual meeting of the Global Think Tank Security Forum held in Venice, Italy discussed some of the major security challenges facing nations today and provided an overview from regional and transnational perspectives. This volume contains the papers that were presented at the meeting.
The Gulf region continues to be defined by multiple security challenges that have an impact on the outlook for stability in this critical part of the world and beyond. In addition to regional issues such as the Iranian nuclear program, uneven transition in Iraq, and prospects of state failure in Yemen, there are also challenges emanating from terrorism, piracy, transnational crime, and the lack of a regional security architecture. The impact of the Arab Spring since the outset of 2011 has only complicated the effort to bring about a more stable security situation. This paper presents an assessment of the key security issues confronting the Gulf region. It also includes an analysis of developments in Syria as seen from the GCC states.
This analysis sheds light on the present situation in Syria and points out to the current conditions which characterize the Syrian conflict. With every passing day, more innocent lives are lost and more needless destruction is inflicted on the country's infrastructure. The paper discusses also the Munich Security Conference that held recently through which it appeared that the international community paralyzed about finding solution to the undergoing conflict. The paper emphasized on the regime gradual degradation as it is losing control over the country which will lead eventually to a final collapse. Moreover, The Assad regime has lost prestige, credibility, and legitimacy, besides losing power and control on the ground. Furthermore, the continuation of the present impasse for a prolonged period will not only be very costly for the Syrian people but also have devastating regional consequences where a widespread spillover cannot be ruled out.
The relationship between the member states of the European Union (EU) and those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is multifaceted and has over the years taken on a number of different dimensions. With security issues such as those related to terrorism, the US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, and concern over a potential Iranian nuclear program coming to the forefront, ties between the EU and the GCC have taken on a security component that up to this stage remains largely undefined and understudied. The collection of papers included in this volume highlight many of the different salient issues playing a role on the security front and put forward perspectives under which this new dimension in relations can be better understood. This includes an attempt to move from the currently still vague and largely theoretical notions of GCC-EU security cooperation into more policy applicable and relevant approaches that build on past European experiences. EU GCC Relations and Security Issues extends empirical insight into various aspects of the European approach to the region from a security-based perspective, provides a comparative context into which it becomes possible to frame a more solid base for understanding European policy in the region, and through the use of case examples illustrates how the present cooperation can be expanded and improved upon
The very mention of nuclear terrorism is enough to rouse strong reactions, and understandably so, because it combines the most terrifying weapons and the most threatening of people in a single phrase. The possibility that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear weapons deserves careful analysis, but discussion has all too often been contaminated with exaggeration, even hysteria. For example, it has been claimed that nuclear terrorism poses an ‘existential threat’ to the United States. This Adelphi Paper attempts to develop a more measured analysis of the risk of terrorists detonating a true fission device. The study attacks the problem from two perspectives: the considerable, Possibly insurmountable, technical challenges involved in obtaining a functional nuclear weapon, whether ‘home-made’ or begged, borrowed or stolen from a state arsenal; and the question of the strategic, political, and psychological motivations to ‘go nuclear’. The conclusion are that nuclear terrorism is a less significant threat than is commonly believed, and that, among terrorists, Muslim extremists are not the most likely to use nuclear weapons.
For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime’s radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi’s rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime’s calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.
Terrorism literature has increased significantly in the last few years. But this book stands apart. Written by someone who has been conducting research on terrorism for 40 years, this book demands special attention. It is bound to find a place in all major libraries and reading lists for the subject.
This book attempts to analyze the ramifications of the Second and Third Gulf Wars for the security of the GCC states between 1990-2007, by examining various aspects such as the nature of the security challenges, the means and methods of facing these challenges including the defense policies, security strategies and the regional security structure in the Gulf region which emerged during these two wars. The book concludes that the Third Gulf War had the more dangerous security ramifications for the region, because it intensified the challenges faced by the GCC states, both internally – extremism and terrorism – and externally from the regional environment (the unstable chaotic situation in Iraq, the Iranian nuclear program, the unsuccessful effort to settle the Arab-Israel conflict and the tense situation in Lebanon, Sudan and Somalia, as well as the international environment which brought into existence new challenges linked to the US strategy which seeks to restructure the region and impose reforms on the GCC states). As for the way the GCC states reacted to these wars, it seems that their response to the Third War was more sophisticated than it was during the Second, mainly because they had to comply with a domestic, regional and international ambiguous environment. The book concludes that the new regional security structure does not only contradict the interests of the GCC states, but also puts their security at a crossroads.
Concern about the spread and use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has developed rapidly since the mid 1990s given the bleak record. As Mike Bourne reminds his readers, SALW misuse in conflict and crime is estimated to result in over 500,000 deaths a year and countl-less other injuries. Moreover, in 90 percent of conf-flicts since 1990, SALW have been the primary weapons used in fighting, and have contributed to the increased proportion of civilian deaths in those conflicts. Armed violence perpetuated with SALW has devastating impacts that are not limi-ited to massive direct civilian casualties. Indirect effects of SALW and their misuse contribute to human insecurity, crippling burdens on the health care system, rising criminality and the privatizat-tion of security, violations of human rights, etc. Whereas the availability of SALW does not cause the outbreak of violence, it may make violence more feasible, more likely, and more destructive.
This book examines contemporary internattional administration of war-ttorn territortries. It explores the nature of these operations in terms of their mandates, structures, and powers. It considers primarily operations in Eastern Slavtvonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor but it draws selectively on relevant historic antecedents, including the International Control Commission for Albania (1913 t14); the League of Nations administrations of the Free City of Danzig (1919-t39), the Saarland (1920 t35), and Leticia (1933-t34); the Allied occupation of Germtmany and Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War; and the UN administration of trusteteeship territories.
That there are a great many things wrong with terrorism is widely acknowledged by people at large, policy makers, and academics alike. The specific question of this book, however, is: What is the distinctive wrong of terrorism? What makes terrorists different from, and morally even worse than, ordinary murderers, kidnappers and so on? The analysis of this book takes off from the assertion that any sensible definition of ‘terrorism’ must include, as a central feature, the fact that it involves the strategic use of terror. That is to say, terrorism is fundamentally strategic, and it is fundamentally aimed at instilling terror.
In the words of its author, this book could be viewed as an attempt to gain greater understanding of regional (in)security in the Middle East through telling about it to others. While accepting that some of the items of the traditional security agenda retain their pertinence, the book argues that critical approaches to security are relevant in the Middle East...
International Relations has become so diversified that it is sometimes forgotten that the discipline was established to study the phenomenon of war, in the first place. Yet the frequent occurrence of war reminds one repeatedly of the old saying: ‘If you are not interested in war, war is interested in you’. This timely, and thought-provoking book provides a realistic reading of past and current warfare (i.e., the conduct of war) with a view to deduct conclusions about the future of warfare...
The US made concerted efforts in the UN Security Council to provide a legitimate cover to its attempts to control the resources of Iraq. However, having failed in its efforts, it led a coalition of some of its allies, and invaded Iraq. After the invasion, US occupation forces were faced with two major problems. First, they had no clear-cut strategy for controlling the post-war situation in Iraq. This was especially the case in the wake of the disbandment of the former Iraqi Army and security forces and the opening of unmonitored borders with neighbouring countries. This led to widespread chaos in the political and security arenas. The second problem was the outbreak of insurgency which took different forms, including both armed and civil resistance to US occupation. Elements of Arab nationalist, Islamic militants and nationalistic Iraqis joined the various insurgency groups, and made it quite difficult for the US to carry out its aims. Having failed to crush the insurgency, the US made attempts to regionalize and internationalize the security of Iraq by various ways and means. These efforts culminated in the holding of the Sharm Al-Shaikh conference to prevent neighboring countries, especially Iran, from interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs, in addition to enhancing control over Iraq’s borders to prevent infiltration by potential foreign combatants.
The decision by the US occupation authorities in Iraq to disband the Iraqi Army had serious consequences for the country. Despite frequent warnings by reputed US think tanks that the reconstruction of Iraq could not be achieved in the absence of security and proper control over borders with neighboring countries, the US occupation forces ignored the warnings and with a stroke of a pen, the Iraqi Army personnel were discharged. One of the major consequences of the disbandment of the Iraqi Army was the transformation of what used to be a strong and capable army into one of unemployed soldiers. Also, the US occupation authorities in Iraq lost control over the former Iraqi army’s huge stocks of weaponry. In addition, the decision to disband the army led to loss of control over borders with neighboring countries, outbreak of insurgency, spread of organized crime, social degeneration, and deep hatred towards the US. Further, it severely affected social services as well as trade, and led to a serious decline in Iraqi national income.
This is the most extensive annotated bibliography on the subject of Gulf security available. More than 2200 entries cover such subjects as oil security; the Iran-Iraq War; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Kuwait War; post-1991 policy towards Iraq and the Iraq War; and the involvement of the United States, Soviet Union/Russia, Europe, and China in the Gulf, including their bilateral relations with the Gulf states. Regional disputes and bilateral relations between littoral states are examined, as well as regional responses to security issues. The final section comprises coverage of internal aspects of Gulf security, including resurgent Islamists, Gulf military capabilities and arms transfers, and sections on each of the Gulf states. The text is accompanied by a comprehensive index of personal names and institutions.
The early transformation in the international community's stance toward the fundamental developments in the nature of terrorist activities, and the ensuing changes in the strategies of the various organizations sponsoring terrorism, appeared during the last quarter of the 1990s. This transformation was in the form of a major shift from the purely domestic nature of terrorist activities to the new trend of "globalization of terrorism". The initial reaction by the international community towards this shift was the unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of a series of resolutions on countering terrorism. The ultimate goal was to establish a unified international position on the fight against global terrorism. Since 1999, the UN Security Council adopted a set of resolutions that led to the formation of three major committees whose mandate has been limited to the primary task of taking the necessary measures to counter terrorism at the international level. At the same time, the UN Member states have been given the right to ask for technical assistance from the international community to enable them fulfill their international obligations in this field. That is why country reports have been so designed to become the basic source of reference for monitoring country records in this respect.
This paper traces impediments to the establishment of a regional security arrangement between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The main argument of the paper is that rapprochement between the GCC states and Iran on security cooperation is unlikely to take place. Even if there is a domestic wish to better regional relations between the GCC and Iran, the preeminent position of the US as a security guarantor in the Gulf means that the GCC regimes will be locked in an alliance with the US and will follow its lead for the foreseeable future. Levels of insecurity between the GCC states and Iran are likely to increase as Iran openly pursues the nuclear option. The paper concludes that the near total American security hegemony in the Gulf today is likely to give the Gulf Arab states adequate tranquility, enabling them to concentrate on domestic threats, as the US will deal with regional ones.
The threat of the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDS) is a challenge facing the six GCC states. However, the real use of WMDS (nuclear, chemical and biological) is a rare incident in regional and international conflicts. Registered cases in which these weapons were used in battle zones, have proved the lethal impact of these horrible weapons, and their propensity to inflict random destruction and mass killing of civilian populations, failing to differentiate between combat personnel and innocent civilians. In addition, these weapons bring devastating damages for the environment in the long range. This was clearly demonstrated by a dozen of cases of incidental leakages, spills or sudden explosions in facilities manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. Today, areas which have been declared as nuclear-free zones represent almost half the size of the globe. Countries that have already signed the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) have reached 113 members of the United Nations, representing four populous geographical blocs, whose leaders were wise enough to take courageous steps of compromises, forgo narrow interests and reach an international agreement to declare their regions as nuclear – free zones. This book is an attempt to explore the possibilities of building upon the successful experiences of other nations in the field of nuclear – free zones, and work out a framework by which the Gulf region, in its wider geopolitical sense of nine countries, could be made a nuclear – free zone, and a region that is totally free of the lethal weapons of mass destruction.
Abstract: The Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin is a quarterly produced publication focused on issues of security and terrorism in the Gulf region, defined by the GRC as the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Iran, Iraq and Yemen. The Bulletin targets key topical areas in the field of security and terrorism providing short but informative analysis by international and regional security experts as well as useful background information and resources.
This study traces the history of the Iraqi army and the most important events it had witnessed since its establishment in 1921 until its collapse after American, British and allied forces occupied Iraq on April 9, 2003. This study also addresses the history of the Iraqi army, as well as the wars and coups it had carried out and the armaments of its sectors and troops. This study then moves to discern and analyze the motives behind the decision to disband the army and its ramification. The potential challenges to face the new army and discussed with a special emphasis on the attempts to improve the security situation after some authority was handed over to the Iraqis as stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1546 adopted on June 8, 2004.
This study aims to reveal the real role of the Iraqi resistance and to differentiate theoretically between terrorism and national liberation in a quantitative manner. The study depends on analyzing the operations carried out by the Iraqi resistance during the first two years of the US occupation of Iraq depending on open resources. These attacks were categorized according to eight tactics including: attacks, shelling, explosives, shootings, suicide attacks, explosive cars, assassinations and kidnappings. The targets themselves were divided into military, political, civilian, ethno-religious and economic. After drawing a comparison among the eight tactics and by employing a normative approach covering the targets and the victims, this study concludes that there are two types of Iraqi resistance. One is national and uses traditional tactics in armed conflicts, and the other leans more towards the terrorist type which employs political terrorism at times of peace. This comparison makes it possible to outline the main objectives of the Iraqi resistance and its identity, as well as its future through discerning and analyzing its development in time and space.
Abstract: The Gulf Research Center (GRC) announces the publication of the inaugural issue of its Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin. In line with the GRC’s commitment to study the factors that define the security climate in the Gulf, the first issue of the Bulletin is dedicated to the Center’s Gulf as a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (GWMDFZ) Project.
The United States and its Western allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 to deter the Soviet Union, which threatened to expand the communist sphere of influence from Eastern to Western Europe after the end of the Second World War in 1945. In 2002, during the Prague Summit, seven Baltic & East European states joined the Alliance and increased the member states to twenty-six.. After the events of September 11,2001, the Alliance established the NATO/Russia Council in mid 2002 to face the challenges posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the Gulf Region, the Alliance is still negotiating with all the concerned parties to arrive at the best possible form of cooperation. Some of the GCC States have recently participated in the Broader Middle East Conference, held in Rome, March 2005.
Since the events of September 11 2001, the international efforts to fight terrorism have been intensified. Not only a global war was launched against this phenomenon and the war itself was internationalized through employing the mechanism of international justice in an attempt to provide support and maintain cooperation and coordination among all the states of the international community. The 1267 Committee of the UN Security Council came into existence as the first tool to internationalize this war. The mission of this committee is focused on declaring as an "International Criminal" any individual or organization believed to be involved in carrying or supporting terrorist activities in general and those of Taliban and Al Qaeda in particular. Though the noble target of this committee and its moral mission is to fight terrorism, some practices and unjustified resolutions prove beyond any doubt that this committee has failed to provide the minimum expected justice and it lacks any judicial regulations that would guarantee the individual or the organization the legitimate right of defending themselves. This documented research sheds light on the mission and practices this of this committee whose existence is a human necessity and whose justice remains imperative for its legitimacy.
During a two-day workshop held in November 2004, the Gulf Research Center (GRC) and the Bertelsmann Foundation of Germany explored the possibility of a greater engagement by the European Union in future Gulf security arrangements. Under the title of “A New Window of Opportunity?: Europe, Gulf Security and the Aftermath of the Iraq War,” over 30 specialists including representatives from all the GCC members states and numerous European Union countries met to discuss the impact of the Iraq War on the current security situation in the region and to outline the steps that can by taken by the EU to alleviate the resulting challenges. The papers from that workshop elaborated upon a number of central themes including the security prerogatives of the Gulf States, the current situation in both Iraq and Iran, the applicability of various security models for the region and the possibility of expanding the GCC-EU political dialogue on security matters. Specific emphasis was given to the notion that the Gulf region could benefit from the European integration process and that by looking at how Europe was able to overcome the historical differences among its member states, the Gulf States themselves could begin to draw necessary lessons and apply them within the region. Both the workshop and the papers stressed the need for a more inclusionary security system in the Gulf whereby all the states can interact more regularly in a systematic manner to discuss security concerns. What is required at this stage is the beginning of a process whereby existing threat perceptions are reduced and confidence-building measures are put into place that can serve as the foundation for a future security architecture. In that context, it is the EU that is particularly well placed to take on the role of honest broker due to the fact that it maintains a regular dialogue with all regional states
This paper explores the issues that will surround the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Gulf and the Middle East. It starts from the premise that such a Zone will not be created unless a regional cooperation and security system is also created within the region. The paper thus considers that issue as well, and the interplay between the two. The paper argues that WMD programs exist in several countries in the region to satisfy multiple security concerns. Any WMDFZ, and associated regional cooperation and security system will thus have to be capable of addressing this complex and multifaceted security situation. The paper then considers other regional WMDFZs, with a particular emphasis on situations where countries with WMD programs have renounced or reversed these programs, and considers what lessons might exist for the Middle East. Finally, the paper concludes with some suggestions and proposals as to how the process might begin of creating both a regional cooperation and security system and a WMDFZ in the Middle East.
Even with Saddam Hussein’s regime removed, the Gulf states will likely continue to ally and cooperate with the United States in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The Gulf states fear potential Iranian aggression or intimidation, they view the outcome of the ongoing violence and power struggles in Iraq as uncertain, and the Gulf governments – particularly Saudi Arabia -- have faced a threat from heightened activity by Al Qaeda or pro Al Qaeda activists in the Gulf states themselves. However, it is also reasonable to expect that, with the conventional military threat from Iraq now removed and the U.S. military presence in Iraq relatively unpopular in the Arab world, some of the Gulf states might move closer to a broad Arab consensus on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and will likely press the Bush Administration to elevate resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute on the Administration’s agenda.
The Arab nation is one with a long history, its roots stretching back to the birth of human civilization. Over the centuries, it has offered a great and remarkable contribution to the advancement of the world’s knowledge and wisdom. In recent years however, Arabs and the Middle East have become more associated with bloody violence and political instability. The region continues to be a forum for such conflict, defying the boundless efforts to stabilize it. The deployment of international peace-keeping forces has been a frequent feature of such efforts in the region, providing protection and assistance for civilian populations. The aim of this paper is to generate a discourse (both internationally and within the Arab world) on finding an alternative to the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in the Middle East. It discusses the possibility of establishing an Arab Peace Force, capable of shouldering the responsibility for peace-keeping efforts and contributing to peace and stability in this volatile region.
This paper explores the role of the UN in the Gulf region from a comparative perspective. In fact, in the past only the interests of the great powers were discussed by the UN Security Council. As such, the UN has not played a security role that serves the regional security of the Gulf. Expectedly, the UN role seems poised to undergo a change in the future as a reflection of the pressing need to preserve the new security architecture in the Gulf region in its multifarious fields, including the military, political, economic and social domains. Obviously, the role of the UN as far as the security of the Gulf region is concerned remains closely intertwined with international politics and the never-ceasing changes unfolding within the international order as it would develop new features over the coming years. By probing these themes along with other issues, this paper seeks to pinpoint the character of the UN role in the Gulf region through an analysis of the UN activities throughout its history. In parallel, the author assesses the UN role and identifies the factors that affect it. He also attempts to anticipate its future in the aftermath of toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.
‘We need to act before the time is over ' a sentence that has been repeated over and over in Washington and Tel Aviv and in certain European capitals during the last few months. The reference was made to what was considered an urgent and pressing 'necessity' to halt any further progress in the development of the Iranian nuclear program that aimed to produce an atomic bomb, presumably with in a short period of time. This paper attempts to examine and predict the Gulf States' reactions towards two possible scenarios that could have a great impact on the regional security and stability: an external military action against Iran, or, Iran's possession of an atomic bomb.
This paper deals with what promises to become a unique case in contemporary world history: The legal process of a head of state, captured by an invading foreign force and declared as a POW. The possible legal, and perhaps some of the not so legal destinies of the deposed Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein are laid out in this paper under close scrutiny. The paper examines the reasons behind the judicial confusion surrounding his capture and discusses the legal and the practical options available to his prosecutors.
If the means of transporting oil across the world are the object of threats brandished by radical opposition movements, within both Leftist and Islamist circles, as a short-term tactic and a long-term strategy, the case of Iraq no doubt stands out saliently in this respect. As a matter of fact, oil holds a special standing within the bundle of economic resources of the country. That is probably why resistant guerrillas fighting the US-UK occupation of Iraq target oil pipelines. As the domestic political scene in Iraq grows ever more complicated, oil is expectedly going to become a point of contention among the country’s main political groups, namely the Kurds in the north, the Shi’a in the south and the Sunnis in the center. The geographical character of the country, too, renders the protection of pipelines an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task.
This paper sheds light on how militant groups in Iraq and some other Arab countries are increasingly resorting to political kidnapping as a weapon to embarrass local authorities, pressure foreign governments, exhort funds, and, last but not least, win cheap publicity.
The attacks perpetrated by the terrorists organizations in Saudi Arabia during the period of Rabee Al Awal and Ramadan 1424H (May to November 2003) targeted against various housing and residential complexes in Riyadh seem to have created a radical turning point either in the strategies and operational tactics of those gangs or in the interception techniques and measures adopted by the Saudi government in combating such a phenomenon. In addition, the attacks themselves have created disparate peculiarities in terms of the stances and attitudes espoused by the Saudi community largely towards the rapidly changing nature of such developments as witnessed recently. Apart from the Juhaiman Al Otaibi’s movement of 1979, which was characterized with confidential objectives and ends, Saudi Arabia sustained a series of terrorist attacks. The first incident which took place in Al Olya district in Riyadh in Jamada Al Thani 1416 H. (November 1995), was perpetrated by an outfit whose operations were carried out under local terrorist organizations called Al Mouthem and Al Hajri. Though the latter has had an inherent sort of dogmatic loyalty to the commander of Al Qaeda, however, no probative evidence had been adduced as to their involvement or connection with any widely established foreign organization. The second attack took place in Al Khobar in Shaaban 1416 H. (June 1996) which was committed, according to the U.S allegations, by the internal Shia religious groups who inspire, support and outsource from abroad to fulfill this mission. This incident was eventually followed by the operations of Rabee Al Awal 1424 H. (May 2003) and other subsequent attacks, which, in their entirety, marked a new and extremely serious era of terrorism in Saudi Arabia.
If the US invaded Iraq to extend their influence over the Gulf, the ground realities indicate that their intention is far from becoming absolutely real, said veteran German journalist-author Prof. Dr. Peter Scholl-Latour. Speaking at a lecture on “New balance of power in the Middle East” organized by the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center and German Business Council late on Saturday, Scholl-Latour outlined his thoughts keeping in view the developments in Iraq and Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The Red Sea enjoys an undeniable strategic location, as it embodies in its own right a self-sustainable and critical sub-regional order within the larger Middle East order. Besides, the Red Sea constitutes a bridge that links a great number of strategic sea routes. This paper seeks to approach the Red Sea region by systematically tracing developments unfolding around it since the end of the Col War era, along with identifying the multitude sources of threats, current and potential, that plague its security and cooperative relations that have been unraveling across the region in light of fast-moving regional and international developments. The paper offers a new security and cooperation paradigm for the Red Sea basin that takes into account the interests of all concerned parties. The linkage and mutual interaction between the security of the Red Sea and the security and stability of the Gulf region and their relation to pan-Arab security, too, are minutely analyzed. Similarly, the paper examines the role of the GCC States in enhancing and consolidating the geo-strategic bond between the two sub-regions.
Almost all political analysts agree that the GCC States have been the most politically and economically affected by the policies adopted by the former regime of Saddam Hussein. Likewise, the GCC States are expected to bear the brunt of ongoing developments in post-Saddam Iraq and whatever ramifications they might yield in the future. In case current conditions in Iraq continue for a relatively longer time, security and stability across the Gulf region will no doubt be seriously threatened. In view of the fact that security and stability of the Gulf region are tightly associated with the future of the state and society in Iraq, particularly since regional as well as international developments related to the Iraqi file are growing increasingly more complicated, it is imperative that the GCC States take a collective and well-planned initiative in a bid to assume an effective role in shaping the future of Iraq, if at least economically. The GCC States need to embrace a sustainable economic strategy towards post-war Iraq by contributing to the reconstruction and development efforts being or to be deployed in the country. In this way, the GCC States would help build a stable Iraq on the one hand and secure economic benefits for their own countries on the other. In fact, the GCC States do possess special economic attributes that would make it relatively easy for them to contribute to the economic reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq. However, the reality remains that such a goal calls for certain conditions, institutions and mechanisms to come into being. Bearing in mind that politics, security and economy are the three pillars of the one and the same triangle, as amply demonstrated by the Third Gulf War, this paper will set forth the major features and aspects of a feasible political and economic strategy the GCC States could enact vis-à-vis post-Saddam Iraq.
Security-wise, the process of exporting oil is rife with complications and hazards. This is especially true today in light of the marked intensification of terrorist acts across the world and the greater ability of terrorists to deal devastating blows to their selected targets. Pipelines carrying oil are spread through vast deserts and giant container ships which sail through tight straits and routes, a fact that exposes them to possible sabotage operations. The book discusses the different types of dangers and threats that loom over the process of transporting oil from fields of extraction and production to ports of export and consumption. The book sets forth the manifold factors that determine the standards adopted and applied to the transportation of oil and natural gas throughout the world. In parallel, the book examines and analyzes the role of radicals and fundamentalists in exasperate fearful concerns over damages against the international economy, a possibility that might have cataclysmic and unprecedented implications for the entire globe.
A United States led attack on the government of Iraq in March 2003 looks almost inevitable. The only way a large-scale invasion of Iraq by US troops before March could possibly be avoided is either if a section of the Republican Guard stages a pre-emptive coup, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein dies or if the government of Iraq agrees to United Nations demands for the supervised destruction of its remaining weapons of mass destruction capability. For different reasons none of these options looks very likely. The alternative will be a short but intensive air war of up to three weeks, followed by an invasion of up to 350,000 troops from Kuwait and Turkey.