Europeans face
a conundrum in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. On the one hand, they are
called on to respond to what they view as Turkey’s violations of international
law, notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and
demonstrate solidarity with two Member States, Greece and the Republic of
Cyprus. Turkey’s violations of Greek airspace and territorial waters, and its
seismic surveys and drilling in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone, as well as in
the regions covered by its controversial Memorandum of Understanding with
Libya, have solicited an EU response.
On the other
hand, Turkey has become a prominent actor in the Mediterranean, notably in
Libya, one that Europeans cannot ignore and that may, if steered, work in
Europe’s interests. Turkey has intervened in Libya militarily in a manner that
falls beyond the EU’s comfort zone. In doing so, Ankara has contributed to a
further militarization of the conflict. However, it has done so to prop up
Fayez al-Sarraj’s frail UN-backed Government of National Accord, thus enabling
it to resist and eventually push back against Khalifa Haftar’s onslaught on the
country. Turkey’s intervention has erased the illusion harbored by some in
Europe and the Middle East of Haftar’s outright military victory on Tripoli. It
has created a mutually hurting stalemate, which has already generated momentum
for a ceasefire. Those hopes had been dashed soon after the Berlin Conference
in January. Back then, Haftar and his backers still believed the winner could
take it all, and military operations picked up no sooner had the ink of the
Berlin Conference’s conclusions dried. Today, neither side can prevail over the
other, and all regional players: Turkey, Russia, UAE and Egypt, as well as the
United States and the EU know this. It is no coincidence that a national
ceasefire was reached last month, whilst all other attempts had failed.
A ceasefire,
however, is not equivalent to a peace settlement, less still to conflict
resolution. It can either represent a necessary stepping-stone towards the
latter, or the condition for a cancerous semi-frozen conflict. One only needs
to think of the sad list of conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus to
remind oneself not only about how easily a ceasefire can crystallize conflict,
but also how this is a cornerstone of Russia’s foreign policy. Moscow’s
interests in stifling the East Med’s gas potential whilst allowing a dangerous
divide within NATO to fester are crystal clear. Such aims are perfectly
compatible with a ceasefire that freezes the conflict and may even accelerate
trends towards Libya’s partition.
In other words,
Turkey’s actions put Libya at a crossroad. They could represent the first step
along a virtuous path in which a military stalemate triggers a durable ceasefire,
which then veers towards a peace settlement and reconciliation. Alternatively,
a ceasefire could become the grounds on which a low-intensity conflict would
persist, used at will by regional players to expand their influence and
exacerbate the vulnerabilities of the EU and NATO’s southern flanks.
In the midst of
contrasting impulses, the EU itself is torn, with different member states
pushing and pulling in different directions. Greece, Cyprus and France push for
a harder line. In November last year, the Council adopted a framework for
restrictive measures in response to Turkey's drilling activities in the Eastern
Mediterranean, creating the possibility of imposing travel bans and asset
freezes on individuals or entities responsible for or involved in such
activities. On top, the EU suspended negotiations on a Comprehensive Air
Transport Agreement and postponed sine die the EU-Turkey Association Council
and the EU-Turkey High-Level Dialogues. It also reduced Turkey’s pre-accession
assistance and invited the European Investment Bank to review its lending
activities in the country.
In March this
year, the EU went a step further. It launched Operation Irini aimed at
enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya. High Representative Josep Borrell
repeatedly stated that the operation is not aimed at any one party, and in
truth Irini has detected ships with different flags carrying weapons to both
warring factions in Libya. However, the EU military operation was perceived in
Ankara and Tripoli as one-sided, soliciting the GNA’s objection. The drive
towards a more assertive position vis-à-vis Turkey has far from ended. As heat
rose to new heights in the East Med over the summer, the debate about sanctions
on Turkey has picked up again. The Foreign Affairs Council in August kicked the
can along the road to the European Council later this month, which is set to
decide whether to move towards meaningful sanctions on Turkey.
Others, notably
Germany, Italy and Spain argue against outright confrontation, vying to open a
channel for negotiation instead. Beyond ideology, the truth is that
confrontation is simply not working. It is preposterous to compare (let alone
hold hostage) sanctions on Belarus with sanctions on Turkey. Moreover, even if
meaningful sanctions were to be imposed on Turkey, it is naïve to believe this
will deter rather than further embolden Ankara in the region. The conflict in
the East Med is not about economics. It is not even about energy. It is a
longstanding conflict over sovereignty and security that will not be achieved
by reciprocal chest-beating by the parties. At best, macho politics can
generate a mutually hurting stalemate that deters outright military
confrontation. At worst, the added geographic and thematic complexity of a
conflict that now spans across the Mediterranean and the Middle East can
inadvertently slip into uncontrolled violence.
Europe’s
divided politics has already had negative effects. It has exacerbated the
already strained EU-Turkey relationship, driven an indelible wedge within NATO,
and pushed Ankara in Moscow’s cynical embrace. By doing so, it has increased
the likelihood that from the crossroad Libya is currently at, the county will
take the unfortunate path towards a semi-frozen conflict.
Rather than
mild confrontation, Europe should swerve towards an assertive rules-based
cooperation with Turkey. Doing so could represent the only way to square the
circle between deterring Turkey’s assertive posture in the Eastern
Mediterranean while working with Ankara to ensure a veritable stabilization of
Libya. The two goals are seemingly contradictory, but practically not. An
Eastern Mediterranean in which Turkey does not enjoy a piece of the pie is
simply incompatible with the stabilization of Libya. Italy for one understands
this well. Given the political geography of the region, Ankara will always need
a friend in Tripoli to break the exclusionary circle that has been built around
it.
The menu of
such a reset with Turkey has been known for some time. It includes moving
forward with a modernized customs union, which would represent a boon for
Turkey and for the EU (less so for the Turkish President), and constructing
upon such revamped contractual basis structured cooperation in the fields of
energy, security and migration. Such cooperation would see Libya as the first
key testing ground.
*Dr. Nathalie
Tocci is Director of the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI)
