Introduction
As the world’s largest
exporter of crude oil and an undeniable financial powerhouse, Saudi Arabia maintains
an important position within the Arab world (US Energy Information
Administration, 2021). Despite its status in the Arab world, instead of
pursuing a wide-ranging and ambitious regional agenda Riyadh has traditionally
focused on its domestic issues and stressed the need for political
consolidation in the wider region.
Saudi Arabia’s
regional policies have mainly revolved around filling political vacuums as and
where they emerge. Of late, the Kingdom has been preoccupied with defending
itself against pressing threats in its immediate Arab neighborhood as well as
focusing on its Vision 2030 transformation program. Riyadh is, therefore, more
focused on defending the status quo rather than trying to assume regional
leadership.
Saudi
Arabia’s Key Threat Perceptions
Many of the Kingdom’s actions in the wider Arab region are driven by the threat perception of Iran. Saudi Arabia views most of the developments in the Arab world mainly through the lens of its conflict with Iran. Iranian meddling in conflict-hit parts of the Middle East has added a new dimension to the Kingdom’s perception of the regional threat. In the recent past, Iran not only tried to export its revolutionary ideals of “resistance” but it also sponsored and instrumentalized Shi’ism to promote its political goals by arming and training Shiite militias.
The Saudi positioning
on the so-called “Arab Spring” must also be viewed within the same Iranian
context and the threat of Tehran’s capabilities to capitalize on power vacuums
in the region (Al-Ketbi, 2020). Against this backdrop, the Saudi actions in the
region can be described as defensive. The Kingdom has always strived to prevent
the negative effects of the regional developments from spilling over into its
borders and endangering its national security and interests.
Saudi Arabia is
preoccupied with fortifying its external security against regional threats
arising due to increased Iranian meddling in its neighboring countries. In
addition, Riyadh seeks to implement its national reform agenda to restructure
its economy along modern lines.
In conjunction, the
Kingdom’s tendency to utilize financial investments as a tool to garner
tangible political influence in the Arab world has become subject to greater
scrutiny and a stricter cost-benefit analysis. While Saudi Arabia continues to
utilize financial and economic means to build political leverage abroad, the
recent assessment within Saudi policy circles, however, is that Riyadh’s
financial investments in its neighboring countries have not produced the
desired results. Considering the Kingdom’s domestic requirements, these
investments have become increasingly unsustainable.
Shifting
Regional Policy
The Saudi policy has,
therefore, shifted gears. The primary focus is now on the countries surrounding
Saudi Arabia’s borders, meaning re-building ties with Iraq, opening
communication channels with Iran while strengthening defense and deterrence
capabilities, pursuing efforts to end the Saudi military involvement in Yemen,
and consolidating ties with fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states
(Kabalan, 2021).
It is in this context
that Saudi Arabia took the lead at the 41st Gulf Summit in January 2021 by
forging the AlUla agreement, which ended the crisis with Qatar. It became clear
to the Kingdom that the cost of tensions with Qatar, especially political, far
outweighed the initial benefits. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia consolidated ties
with all GCC countries with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman embarking on
a tour of the GCC states in December 2021 before the holding of the summit
meeting in Riyadh (Aljazeera 2021).
While Saudi Arabia is
emphasizing Gulf unity, a greater degree of scrutiny is visible when it comes
to engagement with the wider Arab neighborhood, including countries such as
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. In addition to focusing on return on
investments, the Kingdom will also consider the position of foreign partners
when it comes to the issue of Iran. Saudi Arabia is simply not willing to
accommodate countries or entities (such as Lebanon or Hamas) that are
interested in stronger and beneficial ties, while at the same maintaining a
similar relationship with Iran.
The
Way Forward
Moving forward, it is
likely that the Saudi government will continue focusing on its national
transformation program and expanding its economic development and
diversification, which could position the Kingdom to adopt more of a regional
leadership position in the medium- to long-term.
With its focus on domestic priorities, the Kingdom will follow a policy of withdrawing from costly commitments and avoiding entanglements where involvements carry with it mounting costs and low returns. The examples of Yemen and Lebanon stand at the forefront of such policy priorities (Ibish, 2021).
References
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