The institutional relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began in 1988 when the two parties signed a cooperation agreement aimed, among other things, at fostering their commitment to regional integration and interregional cooperation. The agreement included a provision for the establishment of a free trade area. To complement the agreement, the two parties also initiated a political dialogue aimed at fostering their relations. Given the level of interdependence between Europe and the Gulf, both sides expressed high hopes for closer integration and regional cooperation. By 2000, however, it had become evident that the EU-GCC relations had not achieved a great deal of success in this regard. Free trade negotiations had all but stalled and cooperation under the 1988 agreement had proven limited. Political dialogue had stagnated and had failed to overcome trade differences and obstacles. Moreover, there was no energy dialogue, although that had been the principal aim of establishing the relationship. The main point of departure for this study is that since the 1980s, changes in the international oil market have greatly lessened European dependence on oil supplies from the Gulf. The security of oil supplies became less pressing compared to maintaining stability in the Mediterranean. This paradigm shift in the EU's Arab policy was accentuated by the opposition of trans-European petrochemical pressure groups to a free trade arrangement with the GCC. The 1990 proposal for an EU carbon tax also obstructed and delayed FTA negotiations. On the other hand, the nature and dynamics of regional integration within both groups limited their ability to act coherently in conducting their negotiations.
