Objectives and Scope of the Proposed Workshop As noted in the abstract, this workshop will seek to identify the parameters within which a Gulf security entity could function, and the dynamics which might facilitate/impede its effective establishment and organisation. A deeper understanding of the factors involved in creating a collective security framework is important. It should enable governmental and non-governmental bodies within and outside the region to give proper consideration 3 to the initiation, feasibility, optimum structuring and strategic scope of such a development. In order to achieve the above objective, the workshop will need to give attention to the following factors and concerns: 1. The experience with collective security frameworks elsewhere, and the aspects of these which may be of use in taking forward a pan-Gulf collective security organisation. 2. The character and extent of the changes in international, regional and domestic politics which are transforming the security dilemmas facing Gulf States and regimes. 3. The range of security options which are now available to Gulf governments. 4. Organisational structures, scope of responsibility and key characteristics appropriate for a pan-Gulf collective security entity. 5. Possible approaches appropriate to resolving current rivalries/conflicts/disputes (especially the Saudi-Iranian divide): 6. Process of initiation: Role of domestic, regional or international actors in encouraging/supporting Gulf States to move towards collective security entity. a. Domestic NGOs and public opinion b. Regional bodies (the Arab League etc.) c. The BRICS governments (singly or collectively) d. European governments (the EU collectively, or individual governments) e. The United States 7. The likely positions taken by, and concerns of, the Gulf governments: • Saudi Arabia • Iran • Oman • Kuwait • Bahrain • Qatar • The UAE • Iraq The position of Yemen, whether as a potential participant or as a country affected by the development of Gulf collective security, also needs consideration. 8. How external powers may relate to a Gulf collective security entity once it is established. • The BRICS countries (singly or collectively) • European countries (singly or through the EU collectively) • The United States 4 • Other countries While the central concern is with the processes of creating, and possible characteristics of, a Gulf collective security entity, the background factors which affect these processes and characteristics will be given close attention. Of critical importance here is how the rivalries, divisions and hostilities which have characterised intra-Gulf relations in recent times can be overcome (in particular, but not exclusively, the Iran-Saudi confrontation). The latter requires analyses which take full account of the nature of regimes and of the possibilities for transformation within them. Every effort will be made to avoid simplistic organisational solutions to the collective security problem which take no account of the historical, ideological and political dynamics which underpin the existing policies pursued by governments. This requires, furthermore, assessments to be made of the prospects for change within the regimes of the region. Such assessments need to be set within the analytical and theoretical context of regime transformation globally. So also does full account need to be taken of how the external environment impinges on security issues in the Gulf region. This, in turn, requires analysis of the changing global order (both economic and political) and the impact which this is having on how external powers view their interests in the region. Both globally and within the region the predominance of the United States and Europe can no longer be taken for granted. Nor can it be assumed that the United States and Europe will continue to see their presence in the Gulf as critical to their wider global interests. The markets of the Gulf region are now more closely linked to South and East Asian markets than they are to those of the Western world. There is, moreover, every reason to believe that this represents a trend which will be strengthened yet further in the future, creating a wider Asian sphere of mutual dependency. This is likely to cover energy connectivities, flows of investment as well as those of trade. Discussion of a collective security organisation in the Gulf, therefore, needs to be set within the framework of global economic and political change: how the powers which currently have a predominant security involvement in the Gulf see their interests in a changing world order, and how the world’s rising powers see (and will in the future envisage) theirs. The workshop will seek to avoid approaches which suggest that responsibility for security in the Gulf will or should pass from existing external powers to other external powers. The approach, rather, puts the Gulf States themselves at the centre of decisionmaking and potential conflict resolution in the security sphere. The role which external powers can play as facilitators of this process will depend in part on what they can offer the Gulf region – not so much in terms of security support, but more in terms of the help they can give in binding the Gulf region into wider international networks of communication, trade, investment global political inclusion. The collective interests of 5 the Gulf States in wider systems of exchange and engagement will be critical in shaping the region into a cohesive regional entity. Although papers may cover only one small part of the whole picture, it will be important for them to be conceived with the wider picture in mind. What it is hoped will come out of the workshop will not be recommendations on what Gulf governments should do. Rather, the objective, as stated in the abstract, is to create a deeper understanding of the factors involved in creating a collective security framework. The latter, it is to be hoped, can then feed into Gulf governmental consideration of this issue, enabling the consideration to be better informed and more coherent than it might otherwise be. It should also help outside governments prepare for – and if possible facilitate - a changing regional order in the Gulf, where the Gulf States take charge of their own security interests.