Iran and the GCC countries have been at the center of attention since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Although there have been periods of relative calm in IranGCC relations, the main trend has been full of reciprocal accusations of internal interference, rupture of diplomatic relations, and undeclared proxy wars. Conflictive issues remain unsolved, like the Iranian claim on Abu Musa and the Tunbs islands. More important are three enduring questions: leadership in the Islamic world; defining spheres of influence; and the issue of a regional security arrangement (with or without the United States). The emergence of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 generated a new wave of tensions between the Islamic Republic and the GCC states, mainly with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Both countries, plus Qatar, tried to benefit from the new conflictive situations in the countries that had undergone – or are still undergoing – transformative changes in their political make-up. In particular, Syria has become the main arena of strategic and ideological disputes among the three contenders. Egypt (both under President Morsi and after the ‘corrective’ military intervention) has drawn attention from its respective 2 supposed benefactors, as has Bahrain, though in a different way. Less visible, though not less important, are Saudi-Iranian rivalries in the Yemen theatre. Tensions have been building up, mainly illustrated by several Saudi accusations of Iranian involvement. To name a few: First, Riyadh accused Tehran of having orchestrated a plot to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington, D.C. Second, Iran was blamed for being involved in the Bahraini popular revolt (and even having ‘annexation’ plans). Third, in its fight against the Shia uprising in the Eastern Province, the Saudi authorities claimed to have dismantled an Iranian ‘espionage network’. Though tension between Sunni and Shia has been on the rise since the war in Iraq in 2003, sectarian frictions have become paramount in recent years. Arguably, Saudi Arabia is leading Arab-Sunni governments against a Shia ‘invasion’ of the GCC and the rest of the Middle East. In the meantime, negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 have led to an accord. The agreement, which – most importantly – signals an improvement of relations between the US and Iran, will reduce some of the sanction pressure on Iran in exchange for limits on the enrichment program and more intrusive inspections by the IAEA. Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states have cautiously welcomed the nuclear deal. Whether this will be beneficial for bilateral trade, being a source for the improvement in mutual confidence, is an open question. In any case, the implementation of the latest round of sanctions, before the Geneva accord was reached, had drastically affected Iranian trade volumes from and to the GCC countries, damaging not only the Iranian economy, but the UAE too. The objective of the workshop is to address several related questions: How did (and do) the events of the Arab Spring and the recent rapprochement between Iran/US/IAEA affect Iran-GCC bilateral relations? And, m