The six Arab states that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have in recent history been firmly at the centre of international relations and security concerns. Beset by a major conflict for each of the past three decades, the region has repeatedly been proven to be deeply unstable. The struggle over energy resources has been a conspicuous factor in recent wars, including the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the Gulf War (1990-1991), and the US invasion of Iraq (2003). Cursed by their hydrocarbon riches stoking regional and international tension, these resources were nevertheless entirely transformative for the would-be GCC states from the mid-twentieth century onwards, contributing to the extraordinary wealth of these countries and shaping their domestic political and socioeconomic realities. So too, the oil and gas resources became the backbone of their international alliances and proved to be crucial in saving one of the GCC states from continued subjugation with Operation Desert Storm removing Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Oil and its revenues have therefore been at the centre of Gulf security dynamics. Yet, since the 2003 American invasion of Iraq the traditional security dynamics in the Gulf have been questioned. Firstly, this operation demonstrated that the United States is no longer the hegemonic power that was able to impose its will regionally. The Iraq debacle, followed by the American wait and see approach during the Arab Spring with regard to Libya or Syria coupled with the “Pivot to Asia” doctrine, has directly challenged US primacy in the Gulf and its perception by the GCC states. This effect has been compounded by the 2007 economic crisis as well as the discovery of shale oil and gas, which have further reduced the traditional US economic interests in the region. It is worth noting though that US trade interests especially in the defence sectors have increased rather than the opposite. Concomitantly to the American disengagement or perceived disengagement from the region, the GCC states have been faced with enormous domestic and regional challenges since 2011. The so-called 2011 Arab Spring ushered an era of great uncertainty and instability in the Arab world and in the Gulf. Bahrain’s stability in particular has been directly challenged by this dynamic. Domestically, the GCC regimes have been busy fighting domestic movements (such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran backed organisations or Jihadist organisations) that could threaten their stability. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014 contributed further to challenge these societies both from within and from the outside. The Gulf States have been at the forefront of fighting IS in both Iraq and Syria. The power shift in Saudi Arabia in 2015 has also been accompanied by a more active foreign policy that has clearly identified Iran as the main threat in the region. The Yemen operation represents a watershed in GCC states’ military operations. For the first time, a GCC states’ coalition led by Saudi Arabia is conducting a major autonomous military operation. Over the last five years, the GCC states have moved from being passive observers of Middle East security to active shapers of regional dynamics: 3 Qatar and the UAE in Libya in 2011, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Bahrain in 2011, Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Syria since 2011, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia against ISIS since 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain in Yemen since 2015. These power political dynamics have also been accompanied by new socio-economic developments. Firstly, the rapid growth of the GCC states economies have dramatically increased the number of expatriate workers, creating important domestic imbalances between the local populations and the expatriates. Managing this imbalance is a sensitive task. On the one hand, the GCC states need the foreign workforce to maintain their economic growth. On the other hand, such a high rate of expats represents a risk in terms of domestic stability. Indeed, foreign workers run the risk of bringing with them their own dynamics of domestic conflicts. The massive refugee crisis from Syria has been at the forefront of the GCC states’ domestic security concerns. The rapid rise of foreign workers also has domestic implications that relate to food, water and energy security. The GCC states are highly dependent on food imports as well as water desalination. The latter is highly energy consuming. As the GCC states’ populations increase, food and water consumption and, by extension, domestic energy consumption also increase manifold. An increasing share of local oil and gas production is consumed domestically, reducing by the same token the share of oil and gas for export. This creates a budget imbalance and has further highlighted the need for Gulf countries to diversify their economies. The massive drop in oil prices has compounded this effect since 2014. By losing more than half of its value, the new barrel price puts the GCC states’ economies under pressure and requires austerity measures. For instance, Saudi Arabia has for the first time issued government bonds to generate new revenues while at the same time Riyadh is pumping into its foreign reserves to finance the country’s 2015 deficit. The UAE has cut fuel subsidies and introduced VAT. These measures do not fit well with the rentier state model of the GCC countries. These measures aimed at curbing fiscal deficit bear the potential to be domestically destabilising for the Gulf monarchies. As has been briefly sketched here, the security landscape facing the GCC states has dramatically altered, domestically and internationally, over the last few years. The purpose of this workshop is to take stock of these ongoing changes and explore how they are changing the security fundamentals and security agenda of the GCC countries. In particular, it will explore and seek to answer the following: • What are the key dynamics, which redefine the security equation of the GCC countries? • How have the GCC states responded to these changes and why? • How are regional geopolitical changes affecting the GCC states’ security and why? 4 • What is the impact of the rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups on the GCC states’ security? • What is the impact of non-state actors on the GCC states’ security and why? • What is the impact of social movements on the GCC states’ security and why? • How is the regional rise of Iran impacting the GCC states’ security equation and why? • What is the impact of the relative decline of US primacy on traditional GCC states’ alliances and why? • What is the impact of falling oil prices on GCC economic and domestic stability and why? • How have the determinants of GCC states’ energy security evolved and why? • What are the key drivers of GCC states’ food and water security? • Have there been any changes to the governance of the GCC states’ security policies and why? • What are the future prospects for the evolution of the GCC states’ security and why? • Do the GCC states have the capacity to handle the new security environment? • What are the steps taken by the GCC states to handle this new security environment? The purpose of this workshop is to publish an edited book based on the individual papers presented. To that purpose, the panel directors will send a template that defines how each paper should be structured to the selected participants.