When looking at the Arab oil monarchies of the Gulf region, it striking that the incumbent 'liberalised autocracies' seem not just adopting a temporary survival strategy. Rather, they are a (more or less) stable regime type in and of themselves. Political liberalization is used to garner legitimacy from domestic and international audiences. Iran and Iraq clearly are in a different category, though each one on different grounds.1 When it to comes to the oil monarchies, historically power has been held firmly by the elites and their control over societal forces in effect means that top-down reform looks to be the only viable course. Elites hold power so tightly that change will come only if those in power choose to implement it. Nevertheless, the Gulf autocrats – like regimes elsewhere – also practice strategies of inclusion and exclusion, often simultaneously, thereby giving room to civil society actors (CSAs).2 What they will try to prevent at all costs is the swinging of the pendulum to these bottom-up forces. So far, they seem to be quite successful in doing that. Indeed, when speaking about the (Arab) Middle East in general, civil society has until now not made a real dent in the region’s surprisingly resilient authoritarianism. The question thus arises why it has been so ineffective with respect to opening up of the closed political systems? The reason for that looks quite simple: the majority of civil society organisations and movements support the status quo, are single-issue oriented with small constituencies, largely dependent on foreign largesse (though this is different in the affluent Gulf monarchies), advocating conservative reforms and are in most cases simply apolitical. In other words, they are less well-equipped to lead a process of 'opening up' than is often assumed. Recently, some insightful research has been done on the issue.3 A general – though tentative and controversial – conclusion from this research is that we should let go of the myth that civil society itself is a sufficiently democratising force, and that by (only) supporting CSOs things will change. Correspondingly, traditional conceptions of civil society are being redefined, offering a more neutral definition of the concept stripped of its normative liberal value (imbued with notions that civic activism is synonymous with democratic political change). In addition, it offers the possibility that within this ‘enlarged’ field of activism, for instance a number of non-traditional actors such as individual blogger-activists could be included. This means that civil society activism has to go beyond the work of non-governmental organisations working for human rights and democratisation to include ‘unusual suspects’, such as business associations and social groups with economic grievances or demands, civil society structures created by the state or GONGOs, and single individuals who see themselves as fully active citizens attempting to provide a voice that is alternative to the one of the state and use new technologies to ‘activate’ other citizens. All this contributes to separate the notion civil society activism from democratisation, as the two might actually not be related or linked as previously assumed.4 Based on some preliminary research findings,5 the hypothesis has been developed that the state – at least under the rule of the incumbent kings, emirs, and sultans – needs civil society organizations as a 'counterweight' to the old, conservative regime pillars, i.e. the tribes and the religious establishment. This process seems, for instance, clearly to be underway in Saudi Arabia. Although Wahhabis lost control over policy and politics to royalty and state bureaucrats, and wahhabiya itself produced the seeds of mutation leading to interpretations that challenged the discourse of control, the state is still officially based on it. No longer a hegemonic force, but the conservatives can resist any attempt at reform and call the government's bluff. It is in this context that civil society might act as a 'partner'. As Montagu demonstrates, the old unity of umara' and ‘ulama' breaks down, the Al Sa‘ud's need to forge national identity increases and thus their reliance on the voluntary sector's good offices (Montagu 2010: 72). An interesting question could be: can similar phenomena be witnessed elsewhere in the Gulf region?