On the one hand, Saudi Arabia is both regionally and globally an important player which is reflected in an increasingly assertive behavior. On the other hand, the country has many times been viewed as fragile, based on backward values, finite resources, and shaken Western support. However, despite going through some serious destabilizing events in the past, Saudi Arabia has shown a remarkable ability to preserve a high level of domestic stability and regional influence. Since the start of the ‘Arab Spring’ in early 2011, the Arab revolts have revived arguments about the ‘fragility’ of Saudi Arabia and the possibility that the kingdom would be the ‘next’ to experience its own version of the Arab ‘awakening’. The kingdom, however, has so far been immune from widespread political upheaval, apart from regular skirmishes in the Eastern Province with some groups of Shiite activists. Different reasons can be given for this apparent steadiness (see a.o. Gause 2011a and Lacroix 2011), and it does seem that the regime faces no real threat in the short term. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia can be considered as one of the main regional actors vis-à-vis the Arab revolts. In some cases, it has helped in preventing, or at least postponing, the impact of the Arab revolts from changing the status quo. This was done manu militari in Bahrain, but elsewhere (like in Oman, Jordan, and Morocco) through 2 financial and diplomatic means. In other cases such as the Yemeni one, Saudi Arabia arranged a peaceful transition of power that caused a minimum change of the existing balance of power. However, in two other remarkable cases, i.e., Libya and Syria, Riyadh has been (or still is) one of the key actors to facilitate complete regime change (in Libya successfully as we know; Syria hangs in the balance at the time of writing). In countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, after things seemed to be completely out of Riyadh's control for a while, the kingdom has shown a remarkable ability to adapt to the new environment and regain some of its pre-Arab revolts leverage. An increasingly important factor, apart from the mainly bilateral relations with specific Arab countries, is the Saudis’ growing contest for influence with Iran. Clearly, due to the Arab revolts new fields of competition for Saudi Arabia and Iran have opened up, sometimes labeled as a new regional ‘cold war.’ On the global stage, it can be said that there are two contradictory responses towards the developments in the region. The first is that Riyadh's relationships with some major global powers have gone through some difficulties. Saudi Arabia strongly disagrees with both Russia and China over the developments in Syria. Also, since the advent of the Arab revolts, Saudi Arabia and the United States have apparently, and sometimes publicly, disagreed over some vital regional issues. For example, the kingdom seemed to find the way that Washington asked Egypt’s Mubarak to step down improper and humiliating. On the Bahraini front, the US showed some reluctance to accept the sending of Saudi troops to the island (though almost simultaneously a multi-billion defense deal was struck between Riyadh and Washington). All in all, Saudi-US relations are under some tension but it seems farfetched to speak of a ‘crisis.’ The second type of Saudi global response towards regional developments is the recent ‘global reach of Saudi diplomacy,’ that is Riyadh's active diplomacy within international institutions, such as the United Nations. Since the beginning of the Arab revolts, Saudi Arabia has appealed twice to the General Assembly in unprecedented moves to gain widespread international support against Iran (and Syria) in particular. Furthermore, the kingdom has shown an ability to mobilize a wide range of countries behind its own political views over the developments in the region through employing its leading position within a number of regional and international institutions, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference. The most recent success was booked during the August 2012 OIC meeting in Mecca where Syria’s membership was suspended (with only Iran speaking out against). Against this background, a much deeper examination of the Saudi responses towards the ‘Arab Spring’ has proved to be desperately needed. Therefore, the main question of this proposed workshop is: How has Saudi Arabia responded to the Arab revolts at the national, regional, and global levels? And what is the impact of these responses?